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RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER
V
WILLIAM McCLURE
456 US 188, 72 L Ed 2d 1, 182 S Ct 1665
Decided April 20, 1982.
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether Congress, consistently with the require-
ments of due process, may provide that hearings on disputed claims for
certain Medicare payments be held by private insurance carriers, without
a further right of appeal.
Title Xj'II of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat 291, as amended,
42 USC Sec. 1395 et seq. (1976 ed and Supp IV), commonly known as the
Medicare program, is administered by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. It consists of two parts. Part A, which is not at issue in this
case, provides insurance against the cost of institutional health services,
such as hospital and nursing home fees. Sacs. 1395c-1395i-2 (1976 ed and
Supp IV). Part B is entitled "Supplementary Medical Insurance Benefits
for the Aged and Disabled." It covers a portion (typically 80%) of the
cost of certain physician services, outpatient physical therapy, X-rays,
laboratory tests, and other medical and health care. See Sacs. 1395k,
13951, and 1395x(s) (1976 ed and Supp IV). Only persons 65 or older or
disabled may enroll, and eligibility does not depend on financial need.
Part B is financed by the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Fund. See Sec. 1395t (1976 ed and Supp IV). This Trust Fund in turn is
funded by appropriations from the Treasury, together with monthly premiums
paid by the individuals who choose voluntarily to enroll in the Part B
program. See Secs. 1395j, 1395r, and 1395w (1976 ed and Supp IV). Part B
consequently resembles a private medical insurance program that is subsidized
in major part by the Federal Government.
Part B is a social program of substantial dimensions. More than
27 million individuals presently participate, and the Secretary pays out
more than $10 billion in benefits annually. Brief for Appellant 9. In 1980,
158 million Part B claims were processed. Ibid. In order to make the
administration of this sweeping program more efficient, Congress authorized
the Secretary to contract with private insurance carriers to administer on
his behalf the payment of qualifying Part B claims. See 42 USC Sec. 1395u
(1976 ed and Supp IV). (In this case, for instance, the private carriers
that performed these tasks in California for the Secretary were Blue Shield
of California and the Occidental Insurance Co.) The Congressional design was
to take advantage of such insurance carriers' "great experience in reimburs-
ing physicians." HR Rep No. 213, 89th Cong, Ist Sess, 46 (1965). See also
42 USC Sec. 1395u(a); S Rep No. 404, 89th Cong. 1st Sess, 53 (1965).
The Secretary pays the participating carriers' costs of claims
administration. See 42 USC Sec. 1395u(c). In return, the carriers act as
the Secretary's agents. See 42 CFR Sec. 421.5(b) (1980). They review and
pay Part B claims for the Secretary according to a precisely specified
process. See 42 CFR part 405, subpart H (1980). Once the carrier has been
billed for a particular service, it decides initially whether the services
were medically necessary, whether the charges are reasonable, and whether the
claim is otherwise covered by Part B. See 42 USC Sec. 1395y(a) (1976 ed
and Supp IV); 42 CFR Sec. 405.803(b) (1980). If it determines that the
claim meets all these criteria, the carrier pays the claim out of the Govern-
ment's Trust Fund - not out of its own pocket. See 42 USC Secs. 1395u(a) (1),
1395u(b) (3), and 1395u(c) (1976 ed and Supp IV).
Should the carrier refuse on behalf of the Secretary to pay a
portion of the claim, the claimant has one or more opportunities to appeal.
First, all claimants are entitled to a "review determination," in which they
may submit written evidence and arguments of fact and law. A carrier
employee, other than the initial decisionmaker, will review the written
record de novo and affirm or adjust the original determination. 42 CFR
Secs. 405.807-405.812 (1980); McClure v Harris; 503 F Supp 409, 411 (ND
Cal 1980). If the amount in dispute is $100 or more, a still-dissatisfied
claimant then has a right to an oral hearing. See 42 USC Sec. 1395u(b)(3)(C),
42 CFR Secs. 405.820-405.860 (1980). An officer chosen by the carrier pre-
sides over this hearing. Sec. 405.823. The hearing officers "do not_
participate personally, prior to the hearing / stage /, in any case / that_/
they adjudicate." 503 F Supp, at 414. See 42 CFr Sec. 405.824 (1980).
Hearing officers receive evidence and hear arguments pertinent
to the matters at issue. Sec. 405.830. As soon as practicable thereafter,
they must render written decisions based on the record. Sec. 405.834.
Neither the statute nor the regulations make provision for further review
of the hearing officer's decision.1 See United States v Erika, Inc., post p
201, 72 L Ed 2d 12, 102 S Ct 1650.
II
This case arose as a result of decisions by hearing officers
against three claimants. 2 The claimants, here appellees, sued to challenge
the constitutional adequacy of the hearings afforded them. The District
I Hearing officers may decide to reopen proceedings under certain circum-
stances. See 42 CFR Secs. 405.841-405.850 (1980).
2 Appellee William McClure was denied partial reimbursement for the cost
of an air ambulance to a specially equipped hospital. The hearing officer
determined that the air ambulance was necessary, but that McClure could
have been taken to a hospital closer to home. Appellee Charles Shields was
allowed reimbursement for a cholecystectomy but was denied reimbursement
for an accompanying appendectomy. The hearing officer reasoned that the
appendectomy was merely incidental to the cholecystectomy. Appellee
"Ann Doe" was denied reimbursement for the entire cost of a sex-change
operation. The hearing officer ruled that the operation was not medically
necessary.
104
Court for the Northern District of California certified appellees as repre-
sentatives of a nationwide class of individuals whose claims had been denied by
carrier-appointed hearing officers. 503 F Supp, at 412-414. On cross-motions
for summary judgment, the court concluded that the Part B hearing procedures
violated appellees' right to due process "insofar as the final, unappealable
decision regarding claims disputes is made by carrier appointees ....
Id., at 418.
The court reached its conclusion of unconstitutionality by alterna-
tive lines of argument. The first rested upon the principle that tribunals
must be impartial. The court thought that the impartiality of the carrier's
hearing officers was compromised by their "prior involvement and pecuniary
interest." Id., at 414. "Pecuniary interest" was shown, the District Court
said, by the fact that "their incomes as hearing officers are entirely
dependent upon the carrier's decisions regarding whether, and how often, to
call upon their services." 3  Id., at 415. Respecting "prior involvement,"
the court acknowledged that hearing officers personally had not been previously
involved in the cases they decided. But it noted that hearing officers
"are appointed by, and serve at the will of, the carrier /-that-/ has not
only participated in the prior stages of each case, but has twice denied
the claims / that / are the subject of the hearing," and that five out of
seven of Blue Shield's past and present hearing officers "are former or
current Blue Shield employees." 4 Id., at 414. (Emphasis in original.T- See
also 42 CFR Sec. 405.824 (1980). -The District Court thought these links
between the carriers and their hearing officers sufficient to create a
constitutionally intolerable risk of hearing officer bias against claimants.
The District Court's alternative reasoning assessed the costs and
benefits of affording claimants a hearing before one of the Secretary's
administrative law judges, "either subsequent to or substituting for the
hearing conducted by a carrier appointee." 503 F Supp, at 145. The court
noted that Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335, 47 L Ed 2d 18, 96 S Ct 893
(1976), makes three factors relevant to such an inquiry:
3 The District Court recognized that hearing officer salaries are paid from
a federal fund and not the carrier's resources. McClure v Harris, 503 F
Supp 409, 415 (1980).
4 In this connection, the court referred to the judicial canon requiring a
judge to disqualify himself from cases where a " 'lawyer with whom he
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer con-
cerning the matter.' " 503 F Supp, at 414-415, quoting Judicial Conference
of the United States, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(l)(b). The court
found that application to hearing officers of standards more lax than those
applicable to the judiciary posed "a constitutionally-unacceptable risk of
decisions tainted by bias." 503 F Supp, at 415.
Additionally, the court thou ht it significant that "no meaningful, specific
selection criteria govern/ed! the appointment of hearing officers" and that
hearing officers were trained largely by the carriers whose decisions they
were called upon to review. Ibid.
"First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail."
Considering the first Mathews factor, the court listed three con-
siderations tending to show that the private interest at stake was not
overwhelming. 5 The court then stated, however, that "it cannot be gainsaid"
that denial of a Medicare beneficiary's claim to reimbursement may impose
"considerable hardship." 503 F Supp, at 416.
As to the second Mathews factor of risk of erroneous deprivation
and the probable value of added process, the District Court found the record
"inconclusive." 503 F Supp, at 416. The court cited statistics showing
that the two available Part B appeal procedures frequently result in reversal
of the carriers' original disposition.6 But it criticized these statistics
for failing to distinguish between partial and total reversals. The court
stated that hearing officers were required neither to receive training nor
to satisfy "threshold criteria such as having a law degree." Ibid. On this
basis it held that "it must be assumed that additional safeguards would reduce
the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits." Ibid.
On the final Mathews factor involving the Government's interest,
the District Court noted that carriers processed 124 million Part B claims
in 1978. 503 F Supp, at 416. The court stated that "/o-nly a fraction of
those claimants pursue their currently-available appeal remedies," and that
"there is no indication that anything but an even smaller group of claimants
will actually pursue /-an-/ additional remedy" of appeal to the Secretary.
Ibid. Moreover, the court said, the Secretary already maintained an appeal
procedure using administrative law judges for appeals by Part A claimants.
Increasing the number of claimants who could use this Part A administrative
appeal " vould not be a cost-free change from the status quo, but neither should
it be a costly one." Ibid.
5 "Eligibility for Part B Medicare benefits is not based on financial need.
Part B covers supplementary rather than primary services. Denial of a
particular claim does not deprive the claimant of reimbursement for other,
covered, medical expenses." Id., at 416.
6 "/-Appellant. establish/es/ that between 1975 and 1978, carriers wholly or
partially reversed, upon-review determinations' their initial determinations
in 51-57 percent of the cases considered. Of the adverse determination
decisions brought before hearing officers, 42-51 percent of the carriers'
decisions were reversed in whole or in part." Ibid.
then stated, however, that "it cannot be gainsaid" that denial of a Medicare bene-
ficiary's claim to reimbursement may impose "considerable hardship." 503 F Supp,
at 416.
As to the second Mathews factor of risk of erroneous deprivation and the
probable value of added process, the District Court found the record "inconclusive."
503 F Supp, at 416. The court cited statistics showing that the two available
Part B appeal procedures frequently result in reversal of the carriers' original
disposition. 6 But it criticized these statistics for failing to distinguish between
partial and total reversals. The court stated that hearing officers were required
neither to receive training nor to satisfy "threshold criteria such as having a
law degree." Ibid. On this basis it held that "it must be assumed that additional
safeguards would reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits." Ibid.
On the final Mathews factor involving the Government's interest, the District
Court noted that carriers processed1_24 million Part B claims in 1978. 503 F Supp,
at 416. The court stated that "/o/nly a fraction of those claimants pursue their
currently-avail able appeal remedies," and that "there is no indication that anything
but an even smaller group of claimants will actually pursue / an_/ additional remedy"
of appeal to the Secretary. Ibid. Moreover, the court said, the Secretary already
maintained an appeal procedure using administrative law judges for appeals by
Part A claimants. Increasing the number of claimants who could use this Part A
administrative appeal "would not be a cost-free change from the status quo, but
neither should it be a costly one." Ibid.
Weighing the three Mathews factors, the court concluded that due process
required additional procedural protection over that presently found in the Part B
hearing procedure. The court ordered that the appellees were entitled to a de novo
hearing of record conducted by an administrative law judge of the Social Security
Administration.7 App to Juris Statement 36a. We noted probable jurisdiction, 454 US 890
70 L Ed 2d 204, 102 S Ct 384 (1981), and now reverse.
Ill
A
The hearing officers involved In this case serve in a quasi-judicial
capacity, similar in many respects to that of administrative law judges. As this
Court repeatedly has recognized, due process demands impartiality on the part
of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities. E.g., Marshall v
Jerrico, Inc., 446 US 238, 242-243, and n 2, 64 L Ed 2d 182, 100 S Ct I10 (1980).
6 "/-Appellant-/ establish/es! that between 1975 and 1978, carriers wholly or partially
reversed, upon 'review determinations' their initial determinations in 51-57 per-
cent of the cases considered. Of the adverse determination decisions brought be-
fore hearing officers, 42-51 percent of the carriers' decisions were reversed in
whole or in part." Ibid.
7 The court added that appellees "are not entitled to further appeal or review of
the Administrative Law Judge's decision." App to Juris Statement 36a.
Weighing the three Mathews factors, the court concluded that due
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III
A
The hearing officers involved in this case serve in a quasi-judicial
capacity, similar in many respects to that of administrative law judges. As
this Court repeatedly has recognized, due process demands impartiality on the
part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities. E.g.,
Marshall v Jerrico, Inc., 446 US 238, 242-243, and n 2, 64 L Ed 2d 182, 100
S Ct 1610 (1980). We must start, however, from the presumption that the
hearing officers who decide Part B claims are unbiased. See Withrow v Larkin,
421 US 35, 47, 43 L Ed 2d 712, 95 S Ct 1456 (1975); United States v Morgan,
313 US 409, 421, 85 L Ed 1429, 61 S Ct 999 (1941). This presumption can be
rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason
for disqualification.8 See Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 578-579, 36 L Ed
2d 488, 93 S Ct 1689 (1973); Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57,
60, 34 L Ed 2d 267, 93 S Ct 80, 61 Ohio Ops 2d 292 (1972). See also In re
Murchison, 349 US 133, 136, 99 L Ed 942, 75 S Ct 623 (1955)("to perform its
high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice' ")(quoting Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11,
75 S Ct 11 (1954)). But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest
rests on the party making the assertion.
Fairly interpreted, the factual findings made in this case do
not reveal any disqualifying interest under the standard of our cases. The
District Court relied almost exclusively on generalized assumptions of possible
interest, placing special weight on the various connections of the hearing.
7 The court added that appellees "are not entitled to further appeal or review
of the Administrative Law Judge's decision." App to Juris Statement 36a.
8 The Secretary's regulations provide for the disqualification of hearing
officers for prejudice and other reasons. See 42 CFR Sec. 405.824 (1980);
App 23-25. Appellees neithersought to disqualify their hearing officers
nor presently make claims of actual bias. Tr of Oral Arg 34 (argument of
counsel for appellees.)
officers with the private insurance carriers. 9 The difficulty with this
reasoning is that these connections would be relevant only if the carriers
themselves are biased or interested. We find no basis in the record for
reaching such a conclusion.10 As previously noted, the carriers pay all
Part B claims from federal, and not their own, funds, Similarly, the
salaries of the hearing officers are paid by the Federal Government. Cf.
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., supra, at 245, 251, 64 L Ed 2d 182, 100 S Ct
1610. Further, the carriers operate under contracts that require compliance
with standards prescribed by the statute and the Secretary. See 42 USC Secs.
1395u(a)(A)-(B), 1395u(b)(3), and 1395u(b)(4) (1976 ed and Supp IV);
42 CFR Secs. 421.200, 421, 202, and 421.205(a) (1980). In the absence of
proof of financial interest on the part of the carriers, there is no basis
9 Before this Court, appellees urge that the Secretary himself is biased in
favor of inadequate Part B awards. They attempt to document this assertion
- not mentioned by the District Court - by relying on the fact that the
Secretary both has helped carriers identify medical providers who allegedly
bill for more services than are medically necessary and has warned carriers
to control overutilization of medical services. See Brief for Appellees
17-18 .
10 Similarly, appellees adduced no evidence to support their assertion that,
for reasons of psychology, institutional loyalty, or carrier coercion,
hearing officers would be reluctant to differ with carrier determinations.
Such assertions require substantiation before they can provide a foundation
for invalidating an Act of Congress.
for assuming a derivative bias among their hearing officers.11
Appellees further argued, and the District Court agreed, that
due process requires an additional administrative or judicial review by a
Government rather than a carrier-appointed hearing officer. Specifically,
the District Court ruled that "/ e /xisting Part B procedures might remain
intact so long as aggrieved beneficiaries would be entitled to appeal carrier
11 The District Court's analogy to judicial canons, see n 4, sUpra, is not
apt. The fact that a hearing officer is or was a carrier employee does
not create a risk o f partiality analogous to that possibly arising from
the professional relationship between a judge and a former partner or
associate.
We simply have no reason to doubt that hearing officers will do their best
to obey the Secretary's instruction manual:
"The individual selected to act in the capacity of / hearing officer-/
must not have been involved in any way with the determination in question
and neither have advised nor given consultation on any request for payment
which is a basis for the hearing. Since the hearings are of a non-
adversary nature, be particularly responsive to the needs of unrepresented
parties and protect the claimant's rights, even if the claimant is repre-
sented by counsel. The parties' interests must be safe-guarded to the
full extent of their rights, in like manner, the government's interest
must be protected.
"The /hearing officer-7 should conduct the hearing with dignity and
exercise necessary control and order. . . . The / hearing officer-/
must make independent and impartial decisions, write clear and concise
statements of facts and law, secure facts from individuals without caus-
ing unnecessary friction and be objective and free of any influence which
might affect impartial judgment as to the facts, while being particularly
patient with older persons and those with physical or mental impairments.
"The / hearing officer7 must be cognizant of the informal nature of a
Part B hearing. . . . The hearing is nonadversary in nature in that neither
the carrier nor the Medicare Bureau is in opposition to the party but is
interested only in seeing that a proper decision is made." App 22, 31-32,
quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare Part B Carriers Manual, ch XII, pp. 12-21,
12-29 (1980). Cf. Richardson v Perales, 402 US 389, 403, 28 L Ed 2d, 842,
91 S Ct 1420 (1971) clongressional plan" is that social security admini-
strative system will operate essentially "as an adjudicator and not as an
advocate or adversary").
appointees' decisions to Part A administrative law judges.' 12 503 F Supp,
at 417. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court applied the familiar
test prescribed in Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US, at 335, 47 L Ed 2d 18, 96 S Ct
893. See supra, at 193-195 72 L Ed 2d, at 6-8. We may assume that the
District Court was correct in viewing the private interest in Part B payments
as "considerable,' though "not quite as precious as the right to receive
welfare or social security benefits." 503 F Supp, at 416. We likewise may
assume in considering the third Mathews factor, that the additional cost and
inconvenience of providing administrative law judges would not be unduly burden-
some. 13
We focus narrowly on the second Mathews factor that considers the
risk of erroneous decisions and the probable value, if any, of the additional
procedure. The District Court's reasoning on this point consisted only of
this sentence:
"in light of /-appellees' undisputed showing
that carrier-appointed hearing officers receive
little or no formal training and are not required
to satisfy any threshold criteria such as having a
law degree, it must be assumed that additional
safeguards would reduce the risk of erroneous
deprivation of Part B benefits." 503 F Supp, at
416 (footnote omitted).
Again, the record does not support these conclusions. The Secretary has
directed carriers to select as a hearing officer
" 'an attorney or other qualified individual with
the ability to conduct formal hearings and with
a general understanding of medical matters and
terminology. The / hearing officer-7 must have a
thorough knowledge of the Medicare program and
the statutory authority and regulations upon which
it is based, as well as rulings, policy statements,
and general instructions pertinent to the Medicare
Bureau.' " App 22 quoting Dept. of HEW, Medicare
Part B Carriers Manual, ch VII, p. 12-21 (1980)
(emphasis added).
12 The claim determination and appeal process available for Part A claim
differs from the Part B procedure. See generally 42 CFR part 405, sub-
part G (1980), as amended. 45 Fed Reg 73932-73933 (1980). See also
United States v Erika, Inc., post, at 206-207, 72 L Ed 2d 12, 102
S Ct 1650 and pp. 8 and 9.
13 No authoritative factual findings were made, and perhaps this conclusion
would have been difficult to prove. It is known that in 1980 about 158
million Part B claims - up from 124 million in 1978 - were filed. Even
though the additional review would be available only for disputes in excess
of $100, a small percentage of the number of claims would be large in
terms of number of cases.
The district Court did not identify any specific deficiencies in
the Secretary's selection criteria. By definition, a "qualified" individual
already possessing "ability" and "thorough knowledge" would not require
further training. The court's further general concern that hearing officers
"are not required to satisfy any threshold criteria" overlooks the Secretary's
quoted regulation. 14 Moreover, the District Court apparently gave no weight
to the qualifications of hearing officers about whom there is information in
the record. Their qualifications tend to undermine rather than to support
the contention that accuracy of Part B decisionmaking may suffer by reason of
carrier appointment of unqualified hearing officers.15
"/TD/ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US
471, 481, 33 L Ed 2d 484, 92 S Ct 2593 (1972). We have considered appellees'
claims in light of the strong presumption in favor of the validity of con-
gressional action and consistently with this Court's recognition of "con-
gressional solicitude for fair procedure. . . ." Califano v Yamasaki, 442
US 682, 698, 61 L Ed 2d 176, 99 S Ct 2545 (1979). Appellees simply have not
shown that the procedures prescribed by Congress and the Secretary are not
fair or that different or additional procedures would reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits.
IV
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for judgment to be entered for the Secretary.
So ordered.
14 The District Court's opinion may be read as requiring that hearing officers
always be attorneys. Our cases, however, make clear that due process does
not make such a uniform requirement. See Vitek v Jones, 445 US 480, 499, 63
L Ed 2d 552, 100 S Ct 1254 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Parham
v J.R., 442 US 584, 607 61 L Ed 2d 101, 99 S Ct 2493 (1979); Morrissey v
Brewer, 408 US 471, 486, 489, 33 L Ed 2d 484, 92 S Ct 2593 (1972). Cf.
Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 271, 25 L Ed 2d 287, 90 S Ct 1011 (1970T
Neither the District Court in its opinion nor the appellees before us make
a particularized showing of the additional value of a law degree in the Part
context.
15 The record contains information on nine hearing officers. Two were retired
administrative law judges with 15 to 18 years of judging experience, five had
extensive experience in medicine or medical insurance, one had been a
practicing attorney for 20 years, and one was an attorney with 42 years'
experience in the insurance industry who was self-employed as an insurance
adjuster. Record, App to Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 626, 661-
662. 682-68S.
Comments and Queries
I) Note that Medicare is a benefits program, created by an Act of Congress,
funded (in substantial part) by the Federal Treasury, and administered in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary, to which the
carriers are contractually bound. Note also that a final decision with
respect to entitlement is made by a non-governmental employee (the carrier's
hearing officer) without any recourse on the part of an unsuccessful claimant
to review by the Executive Branch. Does the unanimous decision of the
Supreme Court adequately address the District Court's implicit concern
about the constitutionality of this delegation of power? Under what cir-
cumstances might an aggrieved claimant obtain judicial relief from the
hearing officer's determination? Would the claimant have standing to allege
that the carrier disregarded the program regulations in violation of the
contract between the Secretary and the carrier? And in what court would the
claimant sue?
2) Is the position of a Part B hearing officer in any way analogous to that
of an arbitrator? There are cases in which a unit of government is a
party litigant to an arbitration proceeding (e.g., pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement). There are also cases in which a statute prescribes
arbitration as the procedure for resolving private disputes arising under
a public law (e.g., some uninsured motorist insurance claims). Does the
body of precedent developed in such cases have any relevance to the McClure
decision?
3) In Association of Administrative Law Judges v. Heckler, discussed in III
NAALJ Jol. 79, Social Security ALJs, protected by the Administrative Procedure
Act, alleged pressure by the Secretary to conserve Social Security funds by
denying benefit claims. As the instant case makes clear, private carriers
compete with one another f-)r contracts to administer Part B funds. McClure
suggested that carriers are under competitive pressure to limit the payment
of Part B benefits, and that carrier hearing officers have no effective
protection against such pressure. The Supreme Court presumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, that individual hearing officers are fair, and
free of influence. The Supreme Court makes no reference to the criteria by
which specific individuals are selected to be Part B hearing officers, and
imposes no requirement that future hearing officers have credentials equivalent
to those involved in the present case.
4) What are the implications of McClure, if any, for states thit might wish
to restructure their workers' compensation programs?
